Th e purpose of the study is to review the history of politicization in local government (LG) and determine the major factors that aff ect local coordination in Bangladesh maintaining the relationships between politics and administration under the changing provisions of the Upazila Parishad (UZP) Act of 2009 and the partisan LG provisions of 2015. Th e study is entirely based on a literature review where only qualitative data has been explored. Eighteen documents were selected as a data set through searching Web of Science, SCOPUS and Google Scholar databases by using the relevant key-words. Th e study found a number of factors that are outlined by inter-and intra-organizational perspectives which negatively eff ect on local coordination in Bangladesh. Among these factors, lack of proper division of work, fi nancial dependency on central government, lack of a chain of command among LG bodies, and the compulsory advisory role of Member of the Parliament (MP) over UZP are found to be major inter-organizational factors, whereas dual loyalty of transferred departments, unequal project distribution among Union Parishads (UP), and the domination of non-elected members in UZP are also identifi ed as intra-organizational factors that are negatively associated with local coordination. Despite these existing problems, recently adapted partisan LG provisions are also creating a huge confl ict in not only the local administration but also in local politics. In this regard, the government will have a great opportunity to address these burning issues properly through removing these legal and practical barriers for ensuring better local coordination.
implementation, facilities, and duties of Upazila Parishad (UZP)
1 through formulating the act, schedule, rules, guidelines, charter and circulars (Ahmed & Rahman, 2012) . Apart from this, the UZP Act provides opportunities to central government not only to allocate funds for various development activities but also dictates on the procedure of its spending (Rahman, 2015; Sowdagar, 2010) . Moreover, the central government primarily exercises its control over UZP through its fi eld level offi cers such as the Deputy Commissioner (DC) and the Upazila Nirbahi Offi cer (UNO) 2 , heads of district and Upazila 3 administration respectively. Besides that, UZP has to spend the money in the particular sector like education, agriculture, and physical structure determined by the central government based on population and a vaguely defi ned criteria of backwardness (As-Saber & Rabbi, 2009). In this context, UZP has no power to reallocate the money from one sector to another (Zafarullah, 2005) which constrains the scope of responsiveness to local needs.
Central government includes the Member of the Parliament (MP) 4 of that constituency, the UNO who is the coordination and supervision offi cer of the central bureaucracy at Upazila level, as well as the principal executive offi cer (PEO) of the UZP, 'transferred departments' 5 offi cers and offi cers of 'retained departments' 6 . At the moment, a transferred department's offi cer has to be accountable not only to UZP but also to their own superior offi cials. But in the case of retained departments, the UNO plays a coordinator role but local government has almost zero power over retained departments. According to the amendments of 2009 and 2011 to the UZP Act 1998, the MP of that constituency is the compulsory adviser to UZP and he/she will be invited to every meeting of UZP. As per the rules, UZP needs to inform or send a copy to the MP of all communication with central government, needs to take recommendations from the MP about preparing fi ve year and other development plans, and also needs to send a copy of the budget to the MP (Rahman, 2013; Ahmed & Rahman, 2012) . So, it seems that although the MP is an elected representative of the legislature, the provision of the UZP act has created an opportunity for the MP to participate 1 UZP is the mid-tier of rural local government in Bangladesh where it is formed by a direct election. In this study, UZP represents as 'Politics' . According to the UZP Act, UZP is the supreme authority at Upazila over transferred departments. 2 In Bangladesh the Upazila Nirbahi Offi cer, oft en abbreviated as UNO, is the chief executive of an Upazila (sub-district) and a mid-level offi cer of the Bangladesh Civil Service (Administration Cadre). In this study the UNO, as the head of local Bureaucracy, acts as 'Local Administration' . 3 Upazila (Sub-district), formerly called Th ana, is a geographical region in Bangladesh working for administrative or other purposes. 4 A member of parliament (MP) is the representative of the voters to a parliament who is involved with the policy formulation and explanation. In this study, MP represents the role of 'Politics' . 5 According to the Article 24(1) (b) of the Upazila Parishad Act-1998 (Amended up to 2009) thirteen offi cers of the central government at the Upazila level with their subordinates and offi ces are transferred to the Upazila Parishad. Transferred offi cers are 1) Upazila Nirbahi Offi cer-UNO and the Upazila level offi cer of the following departments: 2) agriculture, 3) livestock, 4) fi sheries, 5) youth development, 6) social welfare, 7) health and family planning, 8) family planning, 9) primary education, 10) women aff airs, 11) project implementation, 12) public health engineering, and 13) local government and engineering, these are transferred departments. In this study, these thirteen offi cers are considered as part of the 'Local Administration' . 6 Other than earlier stated thirteen departments all other departments at the Upazila level are retained departments, where UZP has limited access. and interfere in every activity of UZP. Although MPs fi ercely resisted the introduction of UZP earlier, they are now the chief benefactors of this organization as well as masters of all development activities (Rahman, 2014) . Interestingly, the bad relationship exists not only with the representatives of opposition political parties but also with the same political party (Panday, 2014; Ahmed & Rahman, 2012) . Th erefore, the central government also exercises substantial fi nancial and administrative control over local governments in diff erent ways. Mutebi (2004) found that these excessive regulatory and bureaucratic controls over the UZP resemble what was termed as the recentralization of Th ailand (cited in: As-Saber & Rabbi, 2009).
Scope & Rationale of the study Th e study area is limited to UZP coordination whereas all transferred departments including the UNO have to perform their duties under an elected UZP and the MP will have an advisory role over UZP. In this context, this study is confi ned to comprehending the relationships among UZP Chairman (UZPC), the UNO and the MP in UZP coordination activities. 
C urrent structure of Upazila Parishad in Bangladesh
Own Illustration, 2018 In Bangladesh some attempts have already been made to understand the structural and administrative dimension of the problems of coordination in the Upazila administration. But aft er adopting two recent major changes, i.e. the amendments of 2009 and 2011 to the UZP Act of 1998 and the partisan provisions of local polls in 2015, there was a dramatic change in local coordination. However, previous research was conducted mostly before 2009 when there was no elected UZP and nonpartisan LG bodies. Th erefore, we found a couple of recent researches on politicsadministration relations at local level in Bangladesh (Rahman, 2012; 2013; Ahsan & Panday, 2013 ) but these are not enough to accommodate inter-and intraorganization perspective together including the eff ect of partisan local representatives towards local coordination. Besides, the factors associated with poor local coordination that was explored through diff erent studies are scattered and have limited coverage. So, the purpose of the study is to review the history of the politicization of local government and fi nd out, through a rigorous literature review, the factors that aff ect local coordination maintaining the relationships between politics and administration under the changing provisions of the UZP Act and partisan local government provisions.
Pre-understanding of the theoretical standpoints
Th ere is a growing body of literature in public administration and organizational studies that critically addresses the study of coordination. Harold Siedman (1998) rightly observed that coordination is indeed the philosopher's stone of public administration (cited in Kettl, 2003) . Malone and Crowston (1994) stated that 'Coordination is managing dependencies between activities' . Seidman and Gilmour (1986) defi ne coordination as 'both a process of the act of coordinating and a goal of the bringing together of diverse elements into a harmonious relationship in support of common objectives' (cited in Jennings, 1994) . Robinson et al. (2000) have identifi ed three ideal types of IORs: coordination, cooperation and competition that is closely matched with the inter-organizational coordination scenario in the local development of Bangladesh. Robinson et al. (2000) identifi ed coordination as 'the description of relationships which are ordered by the exercise of authority through hierarchy and rules, rather than by the hidden hand of competition or by solidarity based on trust and reciprocity' . Mintzberg (1979) argues that when organization becomes simple to complex and from stable to dynamic, there is a need for diff erent modes of intra-organizational coordination i.e., (1) mutual adjustment, (2) direct supervision, (3) standardization of work, (4) standardization of outputs, and (5) standardization of skills. Among these, mutual adjustment achieves the coordination of work through the simple process of informal communication where direct supervision achieves coordination by having one individual taking responsibility for the work of others. In this regard, work processes are standardized when the contents of the work are specifi ed. In this study, the intra-organizational coordination has been used to denote the existing working relationship among diff erent departments within UZP in Bangladesh. Svara (1985; 1998; 1999; 2006) describes the limits of the politics-administration dichotomous view and also puts forward the complementarity model, which is supported by several empirical stud-ies (Demir & Reddick, 2012; Hansen & Ejersbo, 2002) . Th e Complementarity Model is based on the premise that elected representatives and bureaucrats join together in the mutual pursuit of good governance, resulting in a high level of interaction, reciprocal infl uence, cooperation and trust (Svara, 2001; 2006; Mouritzen & Svara, 2002) . In this perspective, the present study emphasizes how the politicians and bureaucrats maintain their mutual relationships to plan and implement local projects together, which shows the essence of the complementarity model.
Methodology of the study
Th e study is based on a comprehensive literature review where qualitative data has been considered. According to Perri 6 and Bellamy (2012) , data creation methods refer to the procedure of constructing raw material for advance investigation. In this context, data was created through reviewing literature, which included textbooks, peer-reviewed articles and some most relevant reports. Th e articles were sourced through the 'Web of Science' and the 'SCOPUS' databases which are accessed by the University of Science and Technology of China that was extended to Google Scholar as enough relevant articles could not be found through selected databases. At fi rst, we searched from both databases by using the following keywords where the literature search fi ltered the time between 1980 to February 2018, we searched only through 'Title' , the document type was ' Article' , language in 'English' , and the research domain/subject area was 'Social Sciences' . Subsequently, we found 96 articles from Web of Science and 62 articles from SCOPUS by utilizing the following key words. Aft er reviewing the article's abstract and fi ndings, we found 13 articles that are more relevant to the scope of this study, among them two were overlapped in both databases. As a result, 11 articles from these two databases were fi nalized as the data set in this study. 
Total 11
Aft er that, we searched again through Google Scholar by using the same key words, expecting more relevant literature. We found a good number of articles, books, unpublished thesis, and reports related to politics-administration relations at local level in Bangladesh. But aft er reviewing those documents, seven more documents (3 articles, 2 books, 1 report, and 1 unpublished thesis) were selected that were also the most relevant within the scope of this study. In total, 18 (11+7) pieces of literatures were fi nalized for the data set of this study as shown below: 
Discussion and Analysis

Political Experimentation over Local Government in Bangladesh
Pre-British Era. According to the Rig Veda, the ancient Indian Subcontinent was politically divided into numerous sovereign territories headed by a local King or Rajas. Self-governing village communities, i.e. the Panchayat system, had been characterized in India by agrarian based economies during the sixth to ninth centuries (Siddiqui, 2005) . Th is body was composed with the position of headman and Panchayats where central government control was marginal and they had adequate fi nancial resources to perform their duties (Khan, 2016) . During the Gupta period (200-500 BC), there were two types of local councils found, the Vishays (Districts) and Bhuktis (Divisions). But strong central government control was found in Bengal during Pala & Sena rule in the 8 th century. Moreover, the Mughal rulers emphasized to towns that was included a number of wards (Mohallas) and they did not interfere in the early customs of village government but rather they incorporated the village into the administration as a unit for collecting revenue and maintaining law and order (Siddiqui, 2005) .
British Era. A loyal landed class of Zaminders had been vanished in the rural organizations of Bengal through the Permanent Settlement Act of 1793 and it provided the central government with a sound revenue and political support base (Ali, 1987; Blair, 1985) . Th e Bengal Village Choukidari Act of 1870 tried to revive and establish the Panchayat system in the rural areas of Bengal with individuals (fi ve members body) nominated by the district magistrate (Khan, 2001; Ali, 1983) . However, the Bengal Local Self Government Act of 1885 created three tiers of local bodies in rural Bengal: Union Committee for a union, Local Board for a sub-division and District Board for a district. Two thirds of the members of these bodies were elected by indirect elections while the rest were nominated by the government. Th erefore, the Bengal Village Self Governance Act of 1919 abolished the Chowkidari Panchayet and Union Committees and formed union boards and district boards instead of these tiers.
Pakistan Era. In the name of 'decentralization' , the military government led by Field Marshal Ayub Khan launched a four-tier local government system under the `Basic Democracy Order' in 1959 where the Union Council chairmen and members were the electors for the District council, the Provincial Assembly, the National Assembly and the President of the country (Westergaard & Alam, 1995; Blair, 1985) . Besides that, a new level of local government, 'Th ana council' was established under the direct supervision of the sub-divisional offi cers (SDOs) where it comprised of Union Council chairman and appointed offi cials; district councils with the representatives elected by the Union Council chairman and appointed offi cials; and divisional councils with appointed offi cials and representatives elected by the district bodies (Panday, 2011; Siddiqui, 2005 ; Westergaard & Alam, 1995).
Bangladesh Era. After reviewing the history of local government during Bangladesh period, it was noted that both the political government and the martial ruler used the LG bodies for their own sake as political weapons (Ahmed et al., 2011) . As a result, a strong self-reliant local government institution is not established yet. Moreover, the government imposed various decisions over LG bodies through formulating diff erent acts, provisions, orders etc. (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) In 1972, the government formed the Union Panchayet instead of a Union Council by incorporating the nominated members. Besides that, lawmakers along with local party leaders formed the Union Relief Committee that played a vital role in distributing relief materials and carrying out construction and rehabilitation work (Khan, 2016; Rahman, 1997) . Th erefore, the legislators got a great opportunity to consolidate their power by keeping the citizens loyal to them but unfortunately it spoiled the government's image largely due to widespread corruption of partisan relief committees (Rahman, 2013 According to the recommendation of the committee, subdivisions were upgraded to districts and Th ana was upgraded to Upazila (sub-district). Th e committee suggested a three tier representative local government system-Zila parishad (ZP) at the district level, UZP at the sub-district level and UP at the union level. Subsequently, the UZP Ordinance was promulgated in 1982, which prompted the introduction of the UZP which established command over local aff airs in the absence of MPs. Real problems arose between UZPC and MPs when a third parliamentary election was held in 1986 (Rahman, 2013) .
Khaleda
Zia Era (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) Khaleda Zia dissolved the UZP in 1991, and formed the Local Government Structure Review Commission, which recommended a two-tier system of local government: directly elected UPs and indirectly elected district-based ZPs (Sarker, 2003) . Th e TDCC was also instituted comprising chairmen of all UPs, three UP women members and government offi cials deputed at the Upazila level.
Sheikh
Hasina Era (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) Sheikh Hasina made a Local Government Commission which has recommended a four-tier local government system including Gram (Village) Parishad, UP, UZP and ZP. Th e government also took up initiatives to give a formal structure to the UZP passing the Upazila Act 1998, which made MPs advisers to the UZP under their respective constituencies. But the government could not arrange the elections of UZP because of a lack of support from the lawmakers (Ahmed et al., 2011) . Besides, the government made the changes in UP provisions for introducing direct elections for reserved women members at UP level.
Khaleda Zia Era (2001-06)
Gram Sarkar (GS) in place of Gram Parishad had been introduced in this era. Th e UP member elected from the Ward was the Chairman of the GS, which had other membersboth male and female -elected in a general meeting of the voters of the Ward under the supervision of a chairman of GS (Rashid, 2005) .
Era Major Initiatives
Interim Govt. 
Factors which aff ected local coordination in Bangladesh
Coordination can take place either horizontally or vertically. Horizontal or interorganizational coordination can be between organizations on the same status or line, while vertical or intra-organizational coordination takes place within the organization (Malone & Crowston, 1994) . In Bangladesh, local coordination involves local elected politicians, fi eld administration, MPs, as well as central government that entitle the importance of mutual relationships between politicians and administrators. Aft er reviewing the selected articles and books, we found two trends of factors that affect local coordination in Bangladesh i.e. inter-and intra-organizational perspectives.
Inter-organizational coordination
Inter-organizational coordination must be considered when a policy is implemented by multiple organizations. In the present study, organizations refer to the departments of diff erent divisions or ministries posted at Upazila level, while UZP and MPs are those who are involved in local project planning and implementation. Interorganizational coordination takes place in the context where organizations are dependent on each other and need cooperation from each other to achieve common goals. Unfortunately, we found some glitches among the bodies through reviewing the selected literatures which negatively eff ects on local coordination, as discussed below.
Lack of proper division of work & role ambiguity. Th ere is a lack of proper division of functions among the departments involved in the inter-organizational activities of UZP. In this regard, MP, UZP, Union Parishad (UP) 7 , and trans-ferred departments are not aware enough as to which department is responsible for what actions and how it should be executed (Ahsan & Panday, 2013) . Moreover, there is a lack of rules in an Upazila which could guide the departments involved in inter-organizational activities (Ahmed, 2010; Ahmed, 1988) . UZP is authorized to approve all fi les and documents dealing with transferred departments as per section 14 of the UZP Act 1998. According to Section 18 of the UZP Act 1998, funds of the UZP are to be jointly operated by the UZPC and the UNO. Moreover, Section 3 of the Duties and Responsibilities Rules of UZP 2010 allows UZPC to run the routine administrative work of the UZP and supervise UZP offi cials but UZP cannot take any disciplinary action against the offi cers who are responsible for transferred subjects (GOB 2011). Th e role of UZP vice-chairmen is still unclear and that creates role ambiguity in UZP activities (Ahmed et al., 2011) . However, the amendment in 2011 to the UZP Act tells us that the UNO has been assigned as the Principal Executive Offi cer of UZP where the UNO is responsible for performing all of its activities and taking steps for implementing the decisions taken by the UZP, maintain fi nancial discipline and to discharge the responsibilities as per the rules (GOB, 2011). If the UZP found any decision to be violating the law or to be against the interest of the citizens or security, the UNO can inform the central government by keeping the UZPC informed (GOB, 2010; 2011). Section 42 (1) of the Act empowers the UZP for independent local level planning but sub section 3 of the same section empowers the MPs to become a compulsory adviser of UZP, and that creates role ambiguity between them (Sowdagar, 2010).
Financial dependency on central government. It is well known that
LG bodies in Bangladesh seriously suff er from inadequate fi nancial resources. Although Section 41 of the UZP Act 1998 empowered the UZP for the management, supervision and protection of the assets, but the valuable and resourceful assets are controlled by the central government (Sowdagar, 2010) . Government' grants and special allocations are the prime source of the UZP. Besides that, the UZP has limited authority to collect revenues from particular sources such as rent from jalmahals, hats-bazaars and ferries, tax on professional and trading licenses, fees for fairs, exhibitions and tournaments, and tolls from services and facilities maintained by UZP (Rahman, 2012; Siddiqui, 2005; Ali, 1987) . Although the sources seemingly look impressive, the income from these sources is very insuffi cient (As-Saber & Rabbi, 2009). Major sources of revenue including income tax, customs and excise and land taxes are directly controlled by the central government (As-Saber & Rabbi, 2009). On the other hand, elected representatives are reluctant to impose and collect local revenues for fear of losing their popularity (Sowdagar, 2010; Huque, 1992; Ahmad, 1991) as the rural citizens are not habituated enough to pay taxes (Huque, 1985) . With such fi nancial dependencies, the UZP seems to act as extended hands of the central government (Westergaard & Alam, 1995; Ahmad, 1991 
Lack of chain of command among LG bodies.
At present, all three tiers of rural local government in Bangladesh (ZP, UZP and UP) are assigned to manage the same nature of local aff airs in their respective areas under same ministry but unfortunately there is no chain of command among these LG bodies. For the fi rst time, elected representatives exist in all tiers of local government. On the contrary, fi eld administration is also executing the government policies and programmes at fi eld level where a strict chain of command is maintained among the bodies from Upazila to Secretariat level. All UP chairmen within an Upazila are the nominated members of the UZP according to the UZP Act. But UP chairmen, municipality mayor, and reserved women members dominate in UZP activities, and although they are non-elected members of the UZP, their opinion oft en matters more than the others (Ahmed et al., 2011) . On the other hand, the UZP does not have any authority to approve the budgets of the UPs; UPs budget has to be sent to DC for approval. Moreover, UP now receives various kinds of grants from a variety of national and international sources that make it more self-reliant compared to the UZP (Ahmed et al., 2011) . Th e UZP does not have the scope to impose something on the UP as superior bodies, and the same goes for the ZP to the UZP. Th e relationship among LG tiers are not found to be hierarchic, rather it is collegial that accelerates less accountability and mistrust among the bodies (Sowdagar, 2010; Huque, 1985) .
Compulsory advisory role of MP over UZP. According to the UZP Act of 1998, MPs had advisory role over the UZP. But there was no opportunity to apply this advisory role until 2008 due to absence of an elected UZP. Th e interim government (2007) (2008) undertook the UZP Ordinance of 2008 whereby it abolished the advisory role of MPs over UZP. However, Sheikh Hasina's government did not endorse the changes of the interim government's initiative on UZP and they reinstalled the compulsory advisory role of MPs again. Moreover, the concerned MP has to be made aware of any type of communication with the government by the UZP (GOB, 2011). As per the rules, MPs are elected for formulating and explaining the policy in the national parliament where local government institutions and fi eld administration are responsible for implementing policy and government orders (Zamil, 2012; Majumdar, 2010) . Although, MPs are expected to solve the general problems of citizens and improve their living standards in the context of Bangladesh (Siddiqui, 2005) . But problems arose when the elected UZP was established in 2009. Th e UZPC were not interested or ready to receive the compulsory advice from MPs and they treated this role as interfere and disturbance in UZP activities (Rahman, 2012) . Besides that MP's involvement in an advisory capacity may also create jurisdictional complications. It is mentioned that there are more than one hundred Upazila which share more than one parliamentary constituency (Ahmed et al., 2011) . As a result, the UZP having to be faced with more than one adviser is likely to create chaos (Th e Daily Star 8 April 2009 ).
Triangular confl ict among MP, UZPC & UNO.
Confl ict among MPs, UZPC and UNO is the major impediment towards sound and coordinated local development. Since both MPs and UZPC share same constituency in many cases and are elected by the same voters, they are likely to consider each other as competitors in regards to maintaining domination (Hossain et al., 2013; Ahmed et al., 2011) . According to Section 25 of the UZP Act 1998 (amended in 2009), it is mandatory for the UZP to accept the advice and recommendation of the MPs in all development planning and activities. Such mandatory role of MPs created a great amount of frustration among the UZPC because they could not work independently (Ahsan & Panday, 2013). As per the constitution of Bangladesh and the UZP Act, the UZPC will have authority to oversee transferred departments. In this regard, the UZPC may think him/herself the supreme authority of the Upazila as an elected representative; the MP may think that UZPC can do nothing without his/her advice and the UNO may consider him/herself as a most powerful offi cer of the Upazila as a Principal Executive Offi cer of UZP (Sowdagar, 2010) . Moreover, the UNO including other offi cials of transferred departments are not only bound to hear the advice of UZPC according to the UZP Act, but also the UNO is liable to abide by the rules and regulations of the central government. In practice, the UNO and other offi cials of transferred departments are found to be loyal to the superior authority of the line ministry, compared to the UZPC (Hossain et al., 2013; Rahman, 2012) . Since the MP is perceived as more powerful than the UZPC, the UNO has a negative mentality in accepting UZPC over him/her and he/she always maintains close contact with MPs (Ahsan & Panday, 2013) . As a result, the MP utilizes the UNO as an instrument for applying his infl uence in the Upazila.
Intra-organizational coordination
In this study, intra-organizational coordination focuses the relationships among and within the transferred departments as well as UZP functionaries. Th erefore, we found couple of major intra-organizational problems through reviewing the selected literature which also negatively aff ects local coordination, as discussed below.
Dual loyalty of transferred departments. Th e objectives of decentralization aimed to place government employees into fi eld administration to serve under the guidance of local government institutions with a view to reaching the government services from door to door (Morshed, 1997) . Along with the UNO there are 13 transferred departments at the Upazila level belonging to the various cadre services that also face dual control from the UZPC as well as their respective line authorities (As-Saber & Rabbi, 2009). As a result, the government offi cials found it extremely hard to meet the two interests and attachment to the line department is found stronger in most cases (Huque, 2011) . As per the UZP Act, the UZPC is authorized to write an Annual Performance Report (APR) of the offi cials of transferred departments where their respective higher authorities are assigned to prepare ACR (GOB, 2011). Problems arise in coordination when instructions are provided by two authorities for a similar function at the same time (Ahsan & Pan-day, 2013 ). In these cases, offi cials of transferred departments become confused (Zamil, 2012) . As the career advancement of the offi cials of transferred departments depends on the superior line authority that is ensured through ACR, they are reluctant to abide by the instructions of the UZP (Ahsan & Panday, 2013 ; Zamil, 2012). As a result, the delivery of services and the development work through local administration is delayed; subsequently it is diffi cult for offi cials to be accountable to the UZP (Zamil, 2012; Ahmed, 2009 ). However these government offi cers are trained and served initially under the central bureaucracy and their mental makeup adapts more to the notion of a central bureaucracy. Th eir loyalty to the UZP is not absolute; rather they consider their posting to the Upazila as a temporary deportation (Morshed, 1997) .
Unequal project distribution among UPs. Th e composition of UZP is characterized by 'double mandate' where the UZPC, and UZP Vice Chairmen are elected by the voters of the respective Upazila, and the Chairmen of UPs and the Mayors of Pourashava are elected by the voters of their respective territory of Unions and Pourashava (Zamil, 2012) . Moreover, each of the female members and councilors, holding reserved seats for women, are elected representatives for one particular ward only and one-third of the women members and councilors among them are also members of UZP. Considering this situation, it is found to be an organic relationship between UZP and the UPs (Zamil, 2012) . However, the UZP are the key authority responsible for the fi ve year Upazila development plan and selecting the small-scale local projects. In this way, the UZP has to consult with UPs in order to accommodate the demands and needs of the UPs. Following this, the UP submits the small scale project to the UZP through consultation among the UPs machineries. According to the rules and norms, the project should be distributed equally among the UPs on consideration of the number of populations. Unfortunately, in most cases, this does not happen. It mostly depends on personal relationships, the personal whims of the UZPC, and the political affi liation between UZPC and UP Chairman (Rahman, 2014; Ahmed, 2009 ) that can create mistrust and dissatisfaction between them (Zamil, 2012) . Ultimately, these types of relationships hamper the coordination process in local development work.
Domination of non-elected members in UZP.
According to the UZP Act of 1998, all UP chairmen and mayors of Pourashava in their respective Upazila will be the nominated member of the UZP by default, and one third of the reserved women members of all the UP and Pourashava who are elected from the all women members will also be members of the UZP, with one elected UZP Chairman and two vice-chairmen (GOB, 2011). As per the rules, every member has equal voting power in UZP activities that clearly shows the domination of non-elected members. In some cases, non-cooperation by non-elected members of the UZP utilizing their voting majority hampers development activities (Zamil, 2012) . However, Section 13(A) of UZP Act of 1998, amended on December 2011, tells us that four fi ft hs of UZP members may show a no confi dence motion against UZP chairman, vice chairmen or any other member in the case of violation of the Act, serious misconduct or physical or mental incapacity that is also the focus the domination of non-elected members (GOB, 2011). But UP Chairmen and members are elected by the voters of their unions and wards respectively. In that sense they are accountable to the people of their respective unions and wards only and they have no accountability to the entire population of the Upazila but they do have the power to control or hamper UZP activities (Rahman, 2012) .
Ineff ectiveness of standing committee & UDCC meetings. Various committees in the functioning of departmental tasks at UZP level are considered important aspects to ensure coordination. Ahsan and Panday (2013) found that the success of coordination depends largely on how frequently the meetings of a committee are held, how many members attend, how smoothly decisions are made through examining the problems faced by others, and how well they interact in the meetings. However, despite having two major committees (UDCC: Upazila Development Coordination Committee, Standing Committee) for ensuring coordination at Upazila level, coordination is not maintained properly due to the ineff ectiveness of those committees (Ahmed et al., 2011) . In most cases, UDCC meetings are not held regularly. When the meeting is arranged, elected representatives are found to be reluctant to attend the meeting in many cases and they rather used to make themselves busy with other works (Ahsan & Panday, 2013) . Moreover, very few problems associated with departmental tasks are discussed in this meeting. Apart from the UDCC, there is a provision to form 14 standing committees for preparing the departmental project and coordinating inter and intra-departmental functions according to Article 29 of the UZP Act, 1998 (as amended in 30 June 2009). Unfortunately, these committees are limited to paperwork in most cases, and even the meetings of this committee are not held regularly (Ahmed et al., 2011) . Although UZP should take the project proposal from standing committees, in practice, the UZPC dominates the selection of a project by ignoring the standing committees. Consequently, regular and fruitful discussions among the members do not take place either in the UDCC or in standing committees due to the suff ering from the problem of absenteeism and the dominating role of elected representatives (Ahmed et al., 2011) .
Generalist-specialist confl ict. Th e dominating role of the generalist offi cer in the administration has placed the UNO in the key position of Upazila administration of Bangladesh. On the contrary, the specialist offi cers (i.e. medical, education, agriculture, fi sheries, engineering etc.) have to work under generalist offi cers like the UNO at Upazila administration, although they are selected into the civil service through the same examination (Ali, 1987; Huque, 1985) . It is also well known in Bangladesh that most of the meritorious students study in scientifi c and technical subjects, but unfortunately if they want to work in their respective fi eld, they have to perform under generalist cadres (Zamil, 2012; Ahmad, 1991) . Such dominance of the generalist cadres and the sense of deprivation of the specialists offi cials are the main cause of generalist-specialist confl ict in the Bangladesh civil service (Ahsan & Panday, 2013; Ahmed, 1988) . However, the specialists do not want to be controlled and coordinated by the generalists like the UNO at Upazila level who are junior to them in the most cases (Ahmad, 1991) . Besides that, offi cials who belong to the 'administration cadre' consider themselves as the elite class in the public service. Th us, professional jealousy, service superiority as well as the dominating role of the UNO creates negative attitudes among specialist offi cers that ultimately hinder the process of coordination in the Upazila (Ahsan & Panday, 2013; Ali, 1987) . When elected representatives are found in UZP, new dimensions of confl ict between UZPC and UNO have arisen. In this context, the UNO tries to maintain a good relationship with MPs where the specialist offi cers prefer UZPC due to having the confl icting relations with the UNO that create new types of dimensions at Upazila level (Zamil, 2012; Ahmed et al., 2011) .
Role of partisan UZP in local coordination
Historically, the local government system of Bangladesh is utilized by the all ruling parties for their own interest (Rahman, 2013; Ahmed et al., 2011; Huque, 1988) . As a result, a strong self-reliant local government has not been developed yet. Despite these limitations, the government offi cials and the elected representatives of the UZP started to work together at local level in 1985 when the fi rst UZP elections were held but UZP elections remained redundant even aft er democracy was re-established in 1991. It was again re-established in 2009 through a third UZP election. Th e third UZP (2009-2014) for the fi rst time passed its tenure under the amended UZP Act in 2009, and with its continuation, the 4 th UZP election was held in 2014 through direct elections. Although it was a non-partisan election on paper, but there were political fl avors with many candidates ( Karim & Rashid, 2016) . It was found that the ruling Awami League-backed candidates won a total of 220 UZPC seats, while BNP won 158, Jamaat-e-Islami 36, Jatiya Party 3, and rebels of two major parties, independents and aspirants from other parties 40 (https://nextnewsbd.wordpress.com/tag/upazila-election/) which shows the clear essence of a partisan character. Even in Bangladesh, other local polls like 'City Corporations' and 'Union Parishad' elections were held in the recent past with the clear political identity of candidates although they used no party symbols (Rahman & Nasrin, 2017). Eventually, in 2015 the government took the decision to hold all local government elections on a partisan basis for the fi rst time in Bangladesh (Mamun, 2015) . Following this, the 9th UP elections were held in 2016 across the country under partisan provisions. Since there were clear political identities of elected representatives of the 4 th UZP who were elected in 2014, the government decisions of partisan local polls in 2015 practically converted them to act as a partisan UZP (Rahman & Nasrin, 2017) .
Chowdhury (2015) found that the political parties of Bangladesh are not only non-democratic but also a blind patriarchy, by which the political party of those in power systematically politicizes every institution and tries to create strong control by distributing authority to their party representatives by utilizing state machineries and public resources (cited in Rahman & Nasrin, 2017) . In this context, LG representatives are those who are elected under the partisan election, and they maintain a strong connection with the central government as well as their party leaders (Chowdhury, 2015) . Another serious problem discovered is that the local administration is now chaired by a partisan person who makes decision in favor of his/her own party campaigners (Rahman & Nasrin, 2017) . Besides that, the local project distributions among the UPs by UZP depend on the political affi liation of UP Chairmen (Rahman & Nasrin, 2017 ) under this new arrangement. Th e anxieties are that these local partisan UZP representatives are going to be in the queue for national level politics competing with existing MPs (Rashid, 2015) , which creates confrontation among the party leaders at the local level and which creates coordination problems at the grassroots (Rahman & Nasrin, 2017; Chowdhury, 2015; Rashid, 2015) .
During the partisan local polls, a local MP who was the part of legislature was interfering in the nomination process of local government elections not only to ruin the local governance but also to control the local politics in favor of him/her (Chowdhury, 2015; Rashid, 2015) . Furthermore, since the last UZP election was openly party backed and the last UP election was partisan legally, the ruling party was adamant in regards to capturing most of the seats for controlling the local politics through utilizing government machineries as well as illegal power demonstration by their party followers (Rahman & Nasrin, 2017) . Unfortunately massive violence, record deaths and uncontested elected Chairman, election frauds and irregularities, reluctant role of the Election Commission, and strong dominance by the ruling party in the electoral system were common phenomena in the last and maiden partisan LG election that was undoubtedly worse than any other LG election in the history of Bangladesh (Rahman & Nasrin, 2017) . As a result, a long historic stable local administration is dominating by the partisan leaders, in most cases, by the ruling party. Moreover MPs consider UZPC as their rising competitor in national politics, subsequently the relationship between ruling MPs and ruling UZPC are found to be competitive, confl icting rather than cooperative in local coordination, with few exceptions (Rahman & Nasrin, 2017; Zamil, 2012) , and which creates obstacles in local coordination.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Historically, colonial attitudes over the administration of Bangladesh have had huge impacts. During this period, bureaucrats dominated the local elected politicians in maintaining the local aff airs by the infl uence of the British rulers and this continued until 1982. Even aft er the emergence of Bangladesh, MPs were not agreed on decentralizing authority to locally elected representatives due to losing their control over the local administration. But when the militarybacked government came into power, they focused the political support base from rural institutions through establishing some sorts of decentralization. Th rough the provision of the Upazila system in 1982, the politicians gained some authority to control local administration in the name of decentralization. It was undertaken to create strong local support at rural level in favor of the existing military government, not for the betterment of the local populace in the true sense. Since bureaucrats were not used to working under local politicians, they were not happy accepting the elected politicians over them. Consequently, competition and confl icts arose, compared to the cooperation in most cases, and which eventually effect on UZP activities. But the UZP were not functioning continuously, due to non-cooperation by the MPs as well as the negative intentions of the government over the UZP. Aft er long time, a third UZP was formed through direct elections in 2009 under the amendment of the UZP Act of 1998 and it passed its full tenure (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) for the fi rst time. At this moment, the 4 th elected UZP (2014-2019) are also functioning. To make it a success, the government had to enact some rules, orders and provisions. Among these, the compulsory advisory role of an MP over the UZP which was confi rmed by the amendments of 2009 and 2011 over the UZP Act 1998 and the partisan local polls provision of 2015 have changed the total scenario. At the moment, politicians are the dominating agent in the local administration according to the law, but the administrators are not happy at accepting these sorts of changes. On the other hand, the MPs are found to be controlling their dominance over local politics and administration through practicing their legal authority as per UZP rules. Subsequently, there is a triangular confl ict among MPs, UZPC and transferred department offi cials, including the UNO, which slows down local development. Through this rigorous literature review, we found a number of factors which are outlined by inter-and intra-organizational perspectives (see Figure 2 ) which negatively affect the local coordination of Bangladesh. Despite these existing problems, now the party-backed UZP representative of the practically and legally converted partisan UZP are found to be competitive and confl icting with transferred departments, including UNO and MPs, in terms of establishing him/herself as supreme in the local administration, as well as in strong political positions in the local and national politics, which creates mistrust and competition among them. Th ese sort of competitive and confl icting relationships ultimately eff ect local coordination in respect of both of inter-and intra-organizational perspectives.
Figure 2
Factors associated with local coordination in Bangladesh Own construction, 2018 Aft er reviewing the fi ndings of this study, it is shown that most of the factors that negatively infl uence local coordination are legal issues, rather than political and administrative; but these legal provisions are made by the politicians. Among these, role ambiguity, dual accountability of transferred departments, compulsory advisory role of MP over UZP, lack of chain of command among LG bodies, less fi nancial control of UZP, lack of clear supervision for distributing the projects among UPs, and provisions of partisan LG elections are the legal issues that may have the opportunity for revision and reform by the government with the consultation of all stakeholders, not only for the better coordination at local level but also to ensure local political harmony. Others factors which are identifi ed through this study are also the by-product of legal provisions. Although, local public service delivery and local level development planning and execution is dependent on the harmonious relationships among UZP, transferred departments and MPs, this study found mistrust and clashes between the politicians and administrators that should be addressed for not only proper coordination but also for ensuring political coherence at the local level. In this regard, the government should change their mental egoism towards establishing self-reliant UZP where mutual adjustment should be ensured between politicians and administrators through taking proper legal changes according to the identifi ed factors and justifying ambiguous matters instead of the political utilization of UZP in favor of their own interests. On the other hand, under the partisan local government election is not possible to arrange a free, fair and credible way under the ruling party considering the prevalent political culture of Bangladesh (Chowdhury, 2015) . When an elected partisan LG was established through massive violence, election fraud and irregularities and strong dominance of the ruling party during partisan UP election in 2016, it not only increased the competition and confl ict among the stakeholders but also the domination of a patriarchy was observed in local development activities (Rahman & Nasrin, 2017) . As a result, non-political citizens lost the fair opportunity to get services from a partisan LG in most cases. In this regard, the government can rethink withdrawing the decision of partisan LG elections considering the negative consequences of these over Upazila Administration and the confl icting political culture of Bangladesh. However, the major factors that aff ect local coordination have been identifi ed through this literature review based on qualitative data. It was not possible, however, to measure the dominant factors statistically and the degree of infl uence of these factors on local coordination, which may guide the government to set priorities which can be explored further through a quantitative survey.
